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A STATE LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY FOR
ENDING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING OF
COMMUNITY HOMES
ROBERT J HOPPERTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1970, seventeen states' have passed legislation ending or cur-
tailing exclusionary zoning of community homes2 for developmen-
tally disabled persons.3 The most remarkable aspect of this trend is
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo. B.A., Baldwin-Wallace,
1963; M.A., University of Toledo, 1969; J.D., Ohio State University, 1972.
1. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36.581-582 (Supp. 1979); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
,§5115-5116 (Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10.5-133, 30-28-115 (1973 &
Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6530 to 6532 (Supp. 1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59a,
§ 20C (Supp. 1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.2963(16a) (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 252.28, 462.357(7)(8) (West Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11-
2702. 1-.2 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-2(m)-26 (West Supp. 1979); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 3-21-I.C (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.18 (Page Supp. 1979);
R. 1. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-22 (Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 87-11 (Supp. 1978); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 13-2402 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 449(d) (Supp. 1979);
VA. CODE § 15.1-486.2 (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.97(15) (West Supp. 1979).
2, A variety of terms, such as "group home," "foster home," and "community
residence" have been used to describe community-based residential facilities serving
developmentally disabled persons. For purposes of this Article the generic term
-'community home" is used.
3. This trend is analyzed and summarized and a model state zoning statute is
presented in a recent survey of community homes serving developmentally disabled
persons. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES STATE LEGIS. PROJECT OF THE ABA
COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, Zoningfor Community Homes Serving Devel-
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that over one third of the states have implemented land use policies
concerning community homes.4 State legislatures have done this by
limiting, in some instances very significantly, local zoning control.'
Moreover, some of the most forceful legislation has been enacted in
constitutional home rule states such as Ohio.
6
This trend sharply contrasts with the modest results achieved in
combating exclusionary zoning relating to low- and moderate-income
housing.7 Fair housing advocates have secured adoption of only one
piece of state legislation, the Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Act. 8
One reason for this result may be that fair housing advocates, unlike
proponents of favorable zoning for community homes, express little
confidence in legislative solutions to exclusionary zoning barriers.9
opmentally Disabled Persons: Statutory Survey and Model Statute (1978), reprinted in
2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 794 (1978) (R. Hopperton principal author) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ABA PROJECT]. See Lippincott, 4 Sanctuaryfor People.- Strategiesfor
Overcoming Zoning Restrictions on Community Homes/or Retarded Persons, 31 STAN.
L. REV. 767 (1979).
4. There are other significant features of this trend. First, statutes dealing with
zoning for community homes fit the pattern of the "quiet revolution" described and
analyzed by Bosselman and Callies. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971). The legislation fits their "common
theme-the need to provide some degree of state or regional participation in the ma-
jor decisions that affect the use of our increasingly limited supply of land." Id. at 1.
This is so even at a time when some commentators are suggesting that the "quiet
revolution" has ended or perhaps has never begun. See Is the Quiet Revolution
Changing Direction, 31 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., No. 5 at 3 (1979); Bettman
Panel Reviews Quiet Revolution, PLANNNING, June, 1979, at 9.
The "quiet revolution" as it relates to community homes has not been confined to a
particular type of state or region of the country. Unlike the environmentally oriented
legislation which has been the core of Bosseman and Callies' "quiet revolution," this
legislation has been enacted in states of every description and region, not just in states
possessing dramatic and threatened natural resources such as the San Francisco Bay,
the Maine Coast, or the Green Mountains.
5. In six states, Arizona, Minnesota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Ver-
mont, smaller community homes (for six or fewer residents in Arizona, Minnesota,
Rhode Island and Vermont, and for eight or fewer residents in Ohio and Tennessee)
are treated as "permitted uses." See ABA PROJECT, at 2 n.15; note 3 and accompany-
ing text supra. Thus, the developer of a home can locate it as a matter of right, with-
out having to meet any special local conditions or standards. In effect, local control
over these homes is removed.
6. See OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. For a discussion of constitutional home rule,
see text accompanying notes 87-101 in/ra.
7. See N. WILLIAMS, 2 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 608 (1974) and D. Mos-
KOWITz, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 1 (1977).
8. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B §§ 20-23 (Law Co-op 1979).
9. See, e.g., D. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 7, at 372: "So long as there are definite
[Vol. 19:47
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In addition, such advocates have failed to develop and implement an
effective strategy for litigation in this field.'" Recently, there has been
a major attempt to develop a litigative strategy regarding low- and
moderate-income housing." There is, however, little evidence of
successful implementation.'
2
Thus, the remarkable success of proponents of state community
home legislation indicates that they have developed and are imple-
menting an effective approach to combat exclusionary zoning. The
purpose of this Article is to discuss the strategy used to achieve adop-
tion of state zoning legislation in Ohio,' 3 and to recommend a strat-
egy that can be effectively used to achieve the same results in the
thirty-three states that have not yet enacted such legislation.
Ohio is an appropriate example for this purpose because few states
present more formidable challenges. Ohio is a constitutional home
rule state. 4 The Ohio judiciary has a strong pro-municipal tradi-
tion.'5 The state legislature has historically taken a hands-off ap-
proach to local land use decision-making 6 and its state municipal
league is known for its ability to defeat measures that would limit
local authority. " Thus, the strategy adopted and successfully exe-
fiscal advantages to be derived from exclusionary zoning and genuine environmental
concerns, which are supported by such social and racial prejudices as exist anyway,
only an ignorant optimist would expect much voluntary change."
I0. See N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 608.
11. See D. MosKowITz, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
12. See N. WILLIAMS, 3 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 1-84 (Supp. 1978);
Rose, Exclusionary Zoning in the Federal Courts, 2 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 137-41
(May 1979).
13. The Ohio legislation is Amended Substitute Bill 71 which became OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 5123.18 (Page Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as S.B. 71]. See note 1 and
accompanying text supra. For the text of S.B. 71, see Appendix B infra.
14. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. See also text accompanying notes
87-101 infra for a discussion of the political problems presented in a constitutional
home rule state.
15. See, e.g., Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 265-68, 140 N.E. 519,
520-21 (1923); Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 344-45, 168 N.E. 844, 945
(1929), Village of W. Jefferson v. Robinson, I Ohio St. 2d 113, 115, 205 N.E.2d 382,
384-85 (1965).
16. For an article recommending an activist, rather than a hands-off approach by
the Ohio legislature regarding exclusionary zoning of low- and moderate-income
housing, see Simmons, Home Rule and Exclusionary Zoning: An Impediment to Low-
and Moderate-Income Housing, 33 OHIo ST. L. JOUR. 621, 637-38 (1972).
17. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
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cuted in Ohio addresses the range of strategic problems that face ad-
vocates contemplating community home legislation in other states.
II. BASIC GOALS
A. Normalization18
The basic goal of state legislation for community homes is humane,
habilitative treatment in community based, residential settings. This
deinstitutionalized approach to the treatment of developmentally dis-
abled persons 9 is called normalization. Normalization refers to the
principle of providing the "patterns of life and conditions of everyday
living which are as close as possible to the regular circumstances and
ways of life in society."20 According to this principle, disabled per-
sons, if unable to live with their families, should reside in homes of
"normal" size, located in "normal" neighborhoods that provide op-
portunities for "normal" integration and interaction.2' Such commu-
nity living permits developmentally disabled persons to become
productive members of society. It also enables them to participate in
generic services, to receive training for employment, to maintain jobs
in the community, and in many cases to become part of the taxpaying
public rather than an enormous strain on the public treasury. 22
As a result of efforts on many fronts, 23 there has been significant
18. This discussion of normalization is adapted from ABA PROJECT, supra note 3,
at 1.
19. Developmental disability is defined in the ABA PROJECT, sztpra note 3, at 13,
as follows:
"Developmental Disability" means a disability of a person which:
(a)(i) is attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or autism;
(ii) is attributable to any other condition found to be closely related to
mental retardation because such condition results in similar impairment of gen-
eral intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior to that of mentally retarded
persons or requires treatment and services similar to those required for such per-
sons; or
(iii) is attributable to dyslexia resulting from a disability described in
clause (i) or (ii) of this paragraph; and
(b) has continued or can be expected to continue indefinitely.
20. Nirje, The Normalization Principle, in CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL
SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 231 (R. Kugel, A. Shearer eds. 1976).
21. Id. at 232.
22. See generally Chandler & Ross, Zoning and the Right to Lire in the Commu-
nity, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 305 (M. Kindred ed.
1976).
23. See generally ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Community.Based
(Vol. 19:47
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progress in recent years towards normalization. Developmental disa-
bility experts increasingly have advocated community-based care and
habilitation. Equally important steps have been achieved through:
1) judicial decrees requiring that placement in settings less restrictive
than institutions be considered prior to commitment;24 2) recent fed-
eral legislation calling for increased community habilitation for de-
velopmentally disabled persons; 25 and 3) state legislative acts
providing for humane care for these persons.26
B. Barriers to Normalization
Notwithstanding the professional, judicial, and legislative author-
ity favoring community-based treatment, insufficient numbers of
community homes are currently available to serve developmentally
disabled persons. Although this lack of residential facilities results
from several causes, a significant factor is local zoning regulations 27
which effectively exclude or restrict community homes from residen-
tial areas. 28
Mental Health Treatment: Impact of Zoning Development, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
356 (1977).
24. Eg., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub noma.
Wyatt v. Aderbolt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp.
1113 (D. Hawaii 1976).
25. E.g., Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
,§6001-6081 (1976).
26. Eg., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10.5-101 to 135 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 393.13 (West Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1,141 to 1,146 (1976); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 5123.67 to .99 (Page Supp. 1979).
27. Other factors also exist. In Ohio, for example, lack of funding and general
administrative inertia were problems. Officials in the Ohio Department of Mental
Health and Mental Retardation frequently cited zoning as a barrier that excused de-
partmental delays in overcoming funding and administrative obstacles. In effect, they
said, "Let's solve the zoning problem and then we will move on other fronts."
When community home proponents pointed out, however, that the department
could overcome zoning barriers by using state-owned community homes that would
enjoy governmental immunity from local zoning regulations, these department offi-
cials summarily rejected the suggestion as "political suicide" due to the controversial
nature of the zoning for community homes issue. They felt that reaction to that type
of department action would be so strong that department budgets might be gutted in
the state legislature.
28. In Ohio, for example, prior to passage of S.B. 71, approximately one percent
of the more than 930 cities and villages in the state provided favorable zoning treat-
ment to homes. See R. HOPPERTON, ZONING FOR COMMUNITY HoMEs: A HAND-
BOOK FOR LOCAL LEGISLATIVE CHANGE (Ohio State University Law Reform Project,
1975) [hereinafter cited as ZONING HANDBOOK].
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The principal land use barrier to normalization, then, is the local
zoning ordinance. Exclusionary techniques are numerous but the
most prevalent device relating to community homes is the narrow
definition of "family."29 An example is the definition of family used
in the ordinance at issue in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.0 Belle
Terre defined "family" to limit the number of persons authorized to
live on the premises of a single-family dwelling to those related by
blood, marriage, or adoption, with no more than a specified number
of unrelated persons. This narrow definition of "family" usually re-
sults in a municipality having no community homes. Other devices,
however, such as specific exclusions of community homes and "con-
ditionally permitted uses,"' I are used by municipalities to exclude or
to severely restrict such homes.3
While the "conditionally permitted use" appears to offer the ad-
vantage of permitting at least some homes, unfortunate consequences
frequently accompany its utilization. Municipalities may designate
community homes as a "conditionally permitted use" that is permit-
ted only in certain transitional residential areas. They also may des-
ignate community homes as a business use or as a boarding house
and limit them to commercial zones. Finally they may designate
them as a use allowed only in areas where hospitals and nursing
homes are permitted. Such retrictions frequently result in the crea-
tion of ghettos of community homes, particularly in larger center cit-
ies.3 3 Such a concentration occurs because the only districts open to
29. Id. at 3.
30. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
3 1. A "conditionally permitted use" is a land use authorized in a particular zon-
ing district only if certain requirements or standards are met and only after approval
is given by the local zoning appeals board or other public body. The terms "condi-
tional use," "special use," "special use permit," and "special exception" are often used
by political subdivisions to designate a "conditionally permitted use." "Conditionally
permitted uses" are sometimes confused with "variances" which are normally granted
only to relieve a particular hardship arising from application of a zoning ordinance.
Finally, a "permitted use" is to be contrasted with a "conditionally permitted use."
The former is a use by right specifically authorized in a particular zoning district. See
N. MESHENBERG, THE LANGUAGE OF ZONING, A GLOSSARY OF WORDS AND
PHRASES (American Society of Planning Officials, Planning Advisory Service Report
No. 322, 1976).
32. ZONING HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 3.
33. "Facilities that are found for deinstitutionalized people are typically located
in high population density, low income neighborhoods in which large houses can be
converted inexpensively to community residences. These neighborhoods may be fur-
ther burdened when the lack of supervision or treatment threatens to convert alterna-
[Vol. 19:47
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community homes are transitional and politically weak residential
neighborhoods, or business or institutional zones. The ghettoizing
leads to the creation of a new form of institutionalization-large
numbers of community homes in certain areas of a city so that the
homes become the dominant feature of a residential neighborhood.
These concentrations change the character of the neighborhoods and
undercut the very purposes behind "normalization." Further, they
provoke justified, negative reactions on the part of neighborhoods
where the community homes are impacted, and strengthen the re-
solve of other communities to avoid admitting community homes for
fear that such concentrations will occur in their communities.
3 4
C. Favorable Zoning Treatment
The overall goal of the strategy presented in this Article is to im-
prove the quality of life of developmentally disabled persons. To
reach this goal, a secondary goal, that of favorable zoning treat-
ment35 for community homes in localities throughout a state, must be
achieved. This favorable treatment potentially can be accomplished
through several means: 1) litigation that would achieve judicial in-
validation of exclusionary zoning;36 2) local legislation that would
amend exclusionary zoning ordinances so as to permit community
homes;37 or 3) state legislation that would limit the zoning power of
municipalities so as to prevent the exclusion or severe restriction of
community homes.
38
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO FAVORABLE
ZONING TREATMENT
A. Litigation
Proponents of normalization and favorable zoning treatment for
tive care facilities into what one writer has termed the 'new back wards'" (footnotes
omitted). Kressel, The Community Residence Movement: Land Use Conflicts and
Plannig Imperatives, 5 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 137, 139 (1975). See
Crackdown Planned on Homes for the Mentally 11, Dayton Journal Herald, April 13,
1978, at 9, col. 1.
34. ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 2.
35, As used in this Article, "favorable zoning treatment" means state or local gov-
ernmental permission to locate community homes in appropriate residential districts.
36. See text accompanying notes 39-47 infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 48-54 infra.
38. See text accompanying notes 55-64 infra.
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community homes have tried the three above-mentioned approaches
at various times to overcome local zoning barriers. Community
home advocates have used the first approach, that of challenging ex-
clusionary devices through litigation, with some success in a few
states.39 Numerous variables can nevertheless affect the likelihood of
success through litigation:40 1) the specific language of the local zon-
ing ordinance;4' 2) the standing of the community home operator to
bring suit;42 3) the exhaustion of administrative remedies; 43 4) the
strength of the presumption of validity given by state courts to local
legislation;' and 5) whether the state is or is not a constitutional
home rule state.45 These variables make it difficult to predict the suc-
cess of litigation in a given state, much less generally throughout the
39. Eg., Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 563 P.2d 12, 14 (Colo. 1977); Oliver v.
Zoning Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 205, 326 A.2d 841, 845 (C.P. 1974); Little Neck
Community Ass'n v. Working Org. for Retarded Children, 52 App. Div. 2d 90, 94-95,
383 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (App. Div. 1976); Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Associa-
tion for the Help of Retarded Children, 94 Misc. 2d 1048, 1049, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223
(Sup. Ct. 1977); Living Resources Corp. v. Bums, 91 Misc.2d 919, 921, 398 N.Y.S. 2d
928, 929 (Sup. Ct. 1977). The courts have extended the definition of "family" to in-
clude other non-related groups as well. E.g., State ex rel. Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d
644, 650-52 (Mo. App. 1975) (foster home with 10 children); Berger v. State, 71 N.J.
206, 222, 364 A.2d 993, 1001 (1976) (home for multi-handicapped preschool children);
City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305-06, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758-59, 357
N.Y.S.2d 449, 452-53 (1974) (foster home with 10 children). But see Palm Beach
Hosp., Inc. v. West Palm Beach, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 18 (S.D. Fla. 1977)
(10 retarded males deemed not a single family for zoning purposes).
40. For a discussion of judicial responses to zoning issues relating to community
homes, see Kressel, supra note 33, Lippincott, supra note 3, and Comment, Exclusion-
ary Zoning and Its Effect on Group Homes inAreas Zonedfor Single Family Dwellings,
24 KAN. L. REv. 677 (1976).
41. See Kressel, supra note 33, at 148-49.
42. For a discussion of standing in both federal and state courts re: exclusionary
zoning and low- and moderate-income housing, see D. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 7, at
17-63.
43. See, e.g., R. ANDERSON, 4 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 340-44 (1977).
44. For an illuminating discussion of presumption of validity in zoning cases, see
generally 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 103-76.
45. In New York, local zoning restrictions on community homes have been de-
clared invalid because they hindered an overriding state law and policy favoring com-
munity residences. In contrast, such a result would have been almost inconceivable in
Ohio prior to passage of S.B. 71. No previous articulation of the policy of normaliza-
tion would have benefited a community home litigant because the statute would not
have met the very difficult and specialized tests established by the Ohio Supreme
Court in its interpretations of the constitutional home rule provision. See cases cited
in note 15 supra. Therefore the articulated state policy would not have been found by
Ohio courts to supersede the local restriction. See text accompanying note 97 infra.
[Vol. 19:47
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United States. In addition, questions of expense and morale also can
become critical to community home proponents and operators when
litigation occurs.46
In Ohio, proponents of normalization and favorable zoning treat-
ment for community homes concluded, after reviewing the above-
mentioned factors,47 that the chances for success through a litigative
strategy were, at best, problematic. As a consequence, litigation was
viewed in Ohio as a resort to be undertaken only if legislative initia-
tives failed.
B. Local Legislative Reform
A second approach to removing zoning barriers is local legislative
action. Proponents of favorable zoning have suggested to local legis-
lative bodies-such as city councils, boards of township trustees, and
county commissioners-that local zoning ordinances be amended to
provide favorable zoning treatment for community homes. For ex-
ample, proponents might ask a city council to amend its definition of
"family" to specifically include community homes, or that commu-
nity homes be added to the list of permitted uses in residential dis-
tricts, or, that community homes, at least, be established as a
conditionally permitted use or special exception48 in residential dis-
tricts.4 9
In Ohio, concerted efforts were undertaken to break down zoning
barriers at the local level during 1975 and 1976. The Ohio Associa-
tion for Retarded Citizens (OARC) formed a Zoning Sub-Committee
of its Legal and Governmental Affairs Committee. The Ohio Devel-
opmental Disabilities Planning and Advisory Council and the Law
Reform Project at The Ohio State University College of Law jointly
46. Lippincott, supra note 3, at 772.
47. In Ohio, a team of law students in the Civil Law Practicum at The Ohio State
University College of Law prepared a lengthy and detailed memorandum assessing
the opportunities for successful litigation by an Ohio non-profit corporation providing
residential services to developmentally disabled persons. The conclusions of the
memo relating to the factors mentioned in the text were very pessimistic and con-
vinced proponents that success through litigation was unlikely. Confidential Memo-
randum Concerning Zoning Law as it Relates to Plans by the Association for the
Developmentally Disabled to Locate Family Care Homes in District VI. (August 2,
1976) (unpublished paper).
48. See note 31 supra.
49. For an article recommending a local legislative approach, see Kressel, supra
note 33.
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undertook the development, publication, and distribution of zoning
reform handbooks50 aimed at local legislative change.5 In addition,
various ad hoc zoning committees were established in communities
around the state. At the time these efforts were undertaken, six Ohio
municipalities specifically permitted52 community homes for devel-
opmentally disabled persons in some manner, usually conditionally.
After more than one year of intensive efforts, only five more commu-
nities had amended their zoning regulations to specifically permit
community homes, in each case on a conditional basis.53
The Ohio experience speaks eloquently about the improbability of
local legislative success. Notwithstanding a major investment of time
and resources only eleven of Ohio's nearly 940 municipal corpora-
tions specifically allowed community homes for developmentally dis-
abled persons. In numerous communities in the state, reform efforts
were flatly rejected or interminably delayed. Concerned groups and
individuals in Ohio eventually realized that no amount of time or
effort would result in any significant number of local governments
voluntarily admitting community homes.54 Consequently, Ohio re-
form organizations led by OARC concluded that state legislation
constituted the only answer to local zoning barriers.
C. State Legislative Reform
State legislation varies in scope and technique. The most prevalent
50. See R. HOPPERTON, ZONING FOR COMMUNITY HoMES: A HANDBOOK FOR
MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS (Ohio State University Law Reform Project, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as HANDBOOK FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS].
51. The Ohio Municipal League, at the request of the Law Reform Project at
Ohio State University, cooperated in the preparation of the zoning handbooks by
offering technical advice, by providing a cover letter from its Executive Director in
the handbook for municipal officials, see text accompanying note 71 infra, and by
distributing this handbook to its membership.
52. "Specifically permitted" means that the municipality explicitly allowed "com-
munity homes," "group homes," "family homes," or "licensed residential facilities"
serving developmentally disabled persons. In other words, the city took specific ac-
tion to recognize and include such homes as some type of permitted or conditionally
permitted use in the text of its zoning ordinance. The term "specifically permitted"
does not include treatment of "community homes" etc., by a city under general ad-
ministrative flexibility devices such as variances, special exceptions, etc. See notes 57
and 114 infra.
53. ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 3 n.20.
54. At the rate of local change achieved in Ohio in 1975 and 1976, it would have
taken proponents between 300 and 400 years to obtain favorable zoning treatment in
all of the state's more than 930 municipalities.
[Vol. 19:47
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and effective approach taken by states that have already enacted leg-
islation declares community homes to be a residential use that is a
permitted (as opposed to a conditionally permitted)55 use in all resi-
dential districts of the state.56 This type of state legislation prevents
municipalities from excluding these homes.
There are forceful arguments favoring the state-type legislative ap-
proach. First, it avoids most of the disadvantages of the litigative and
local legislative approaches. 57 Variables relating to success of litiga-
tion such as language of the local ordinance, standing, exhaustion,
and presumption of validity are not present and no expensive and
protracted litigation is required.5" In addition, the vagaries of local
legislative processes are sidestepped. 9 More important, however, are
the strong affirmative reasons for state legislation. As long as each
political subdivision retains broad discretion to admit or exclude
community homes, there is no incentive for admitting them. On the
contrary, there are strong incentives for political subdivisions to ex-
clude such homes because, under present circumstances, if one com-
munity acts in a progressive, constructive manner to permit
community homes, there is a high probability that it will become a
magnet for large numbers of these homes. This occurs because oper-
ators have nowhere else to establish much-needed residences. Once
this rush to one city occurs and officials in other political subdivisions
perceive the phenomena, their conviction to exclude community
55. See note 31 supra.
56. See ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 4.
57. Enactment of state legislation does not end the possibility of litigation. As
expected by proponents in Ohio, S.B. 71 was soon challenged by two municipalities,
Canton and Columbus. In Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Assoc., No. 4968 (Ohio App.,
March 7, 1979) the Ohio Court of Appeals of Stark County reversed a common pleas
court opinion that found S.B. 71 in violation of the Ohio constitutional home rule
provision (Article XVIII, Sec. 3, infra note 93). The court of appeals found S.B. 71 to
be constitutional because it was a "general law, within the meaning of Art. XVIII,
Sec. 3 and because the Canton zoning ordinance was in "conflict" with S.B. 71.
In Columbus v. Rhodes, No. 79-AP-214 (Ohio App., Oct. 9, 1979) the Franklin
County Court of Appeals found that the Columbus zoning treatment of community
homes "is exempt from the provisions of subsections (B) and (E) of R.C. 5123.18 by
virtue of subsection (G) ...." the "grandfather clause" of S.B. 71. Id. at 8. The
court did not reach the constitutional home rule issue regarding S.B. 71.
For a discussion of the Ohio constitutional question raised by these cases, see note
97 infra.
58. See text accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
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homes is reinforced.6°
Local decision-making regarding community homes guarantees
undesirable results. Either communities exclude such homes entirely
or, at best, they permit them conditionally in a few zones which can
lead to ghettos and impaction.6'
In contrast, uniform, state-wide requirements can supersede paro-
chial, local action, provide for anti-impaction devices (dispersal re-
quirements), and open up desirable neighborboods throughout a
state on an equitable, fair-share basis. If the normalization and the
community home concepts are to succeed they can do so only across
an entire state as a result of state legislation that is not subject to the
veto of political subdivisions.62
For these reasons, proponents of community homes in Ohio con-
cluded that state legislation was the only realistic approach to achieve
early and meaningful success in combating local exclusionary zoning.
To this end, proponents drafted state legislation, S.B. 71,63 designed
to locate community homes in all residential districts in the state.
Proponents then developed and implemented the legislative strategy
discussed in section V of this Article. Later, the bill became one of
the key examples of state legislation used to draft the American Bar
Association's Model State Zoning Statute.64
IV. MODEL STATE ZONING LEGISLATION
Zoning is deemed critical to developmentally disabled persons by
the American Bar Association Commission on the Mentally Disabled
as well as the Commission's Advisory Board of the Developmental
Disabilities State Legislative Project. As a result, the ABA Commis-
sion on the Mentally Disabled commissioned the preparation of the
Model State Zoning Statute65 (presented in Appendix A) with the
hope that such legislation:
(a) will help assure that any legislation advanced is well con-
ceived and can draw on the best thinking, most advanced con-
cepts, and outstanding work products from other states;
(b) will save considerable time and money for individual states
60. ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 2.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 3.
63. See note 13 supra. For the text of S.B. 71, see Appendix B.
64. ABA PROJECT, supra note 3.
65. Id.
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who would otherwise have to duplicate efforts to assure that
their own formulations were sound; and
(c) will assure that states have before them all options available
in their effort to determine the direction that is optimal and best
fits local conditions.66
In addition, Judge Joseph Schneider, the Vice Chairman of the Com-
mission and the Chairman of the Advisory Board, offered the follow-
ing perspective:
In a very real sense, a test of the project and measure of its
results and benefits will be the number of "have not" states that
become "have" states in important legislative areas. No enact-
ment, of course, will or can hope to be solely (or even primarily)
attributable to the project. Legislative success is a matter of local
responsibility and commitment and depends on a great deal
more than the availability of sound models and guidance in the
drafting of legislation.6
7
This Article goes a significant step beyond the Model State Zoning
Statute by laying out a legislative strategy to achieve passage of legis-
lation based on the Model Statute in each of the thirty-three states
which still lack limitations on local exclusionary zoning.
V. A STRATEGY FOR STATE LEGISLATION:
SEVEN KEY ELEMENTS
A. ldentfication and Preparation of Policy Arguments
1. Proponents' Policy Goals
An obvious first step in a successful legislative strategy is identifica-
tion and clear understanding of one's own policy goals. Once this is
done an advocate can effectively and confidently develop a legislative
strategy tailored to, and consistent with, his goals.
In Ohio, normalization had for some time been a primary objective
of OARC. For instance, this organization lobbied vigorously and ef-
fectively for S.B. 336, Ohio's institutional rights legislation,68 the un-
derlying policy of which was normalization. Members of OARC
perceived, however, that more than institutional rights legislation was
needed to implement this policy goal. Evidence indicated that local
zoning had become a major barrier. As an organization, OARC con-
66. Id. at Introduction.
67. Id
68. Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.67-.99 (Page Supp. 1978). This legislation
passed the Ohio General Assembly in 1974 and became effective July 1, 1975.
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cluded that state zoning legislation to address the zoning barriers was
necessary so that normalization could proceed.69 OARC and other
proponents then developed the legislative strategy to pass zoning leg-
islation discussed in this Article.
2. Opponent's Policy Goals
Legislative advocates frequently do not carefully study the policy
goals of opponents. This is a fatal mistake; no matter how skillfully a
legislative advocate presents his side he may, nevertheless, fail if leg-
islators are not convinced that the advocate's policy should prevail
over the opponents'. If the substance, and also the strengths and
weaknesses of the opponent's basic position are understood, however,
they can be countered effectively.
Previous experience had taught proponents of state zoning legisla-
tion that the Ohio Municipal League, the lobbying organization for
Ohio cities and villages, would be their principal opponent."0 The
League had no particular quarrel with community homes, but it op-
posed any zoning reform except one voluntarily enacted by an indi-
vidual municipality. The executive director of the League clearly
articulated this position in his cover letter to municipalities that was
included in Zoningfor Community Homes: A Handbookfor Muncioal
Officials:
As many of you knbw, recent trends in the treatment of men-
tally retarded and developmentally disabled persons have had
effects on local zoning across the state. It is the announced pol-
icy of the state of Ohio to promote deinstitutionalization of
many mentally retarded persons and their assimilation into the
ordinary life of the communities in which they live.
In some Ohio municipalities the community-based residence
facilities that house the mentally retarded are already afforded
favorable zoning treatment, while in many others local zoning
ordinances do not provide for such homes.
It goes without saying that the League position is that policy
questions relating to the zoning of community-based residence
facilities for the mentally retarded are mattersfor local decision-
makingprocesses. However, when a municipality resolves to ac-
69. See text accompanying notes 55-64 supra.
70. As the author of handbooks on local zoning change for community homes,
e.-., ZONING HANDBOOK, supra note 28; HANDBOOK FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS,
supra note 50, this writer developed a first-hand knowledge of the League viewpoint
regarding state versus local zoning legislation for community homes.
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commodate such facilities, many technical, legal and drafting
questions can arise.
With this in mind, an Ohio Municipal League Task Force,
composed of representative municipal officials have worked with
the Law Reform Project at the Ohio State University Law
School to develop acceptable solutions to the technical problems
related to community-based residence facilities such as family
care homes and group homes. We feel that the zoning tech-
niques discussed in this pamphlet are sound, balanced, and take
into consideration the needs of both neighbors and the commu-
nity at large. We recommend your consideration and utilization
of the suggested approaches if your municipality decides to pro-
vide favorable zoning treatment to such homes.71
Obviously, the League did not advocate warehousing of mentally
retarded and developmentally disabled persons. It merely wanted to
protect local control over zoning matters. The League considered
this concept critical to the needs and self-interest of Ohio cities and
villages.
Recognizing that the basic policy of the League was local control,
proponents prepared their policy arguments in favor of S.B. 71.
Their task was a formidable one, partly because of the political
strength of the Ohio Municipal League. Veteran State House observ-
ers in Columbus suggested that proponents should expect early de-
feat. These observers correctly pointed out the League's remarkable
track record of defeating legislative and constitutional proposals that
would limit local control.72 The "bottom-line" was that the League
possessed the political clout in the state capitol to defeat any legisla-
tive proposal it opposed.
Proponents' efforts to pass S.B. 71, introduced on February 8,
71. HANDBOOK FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS, supra note 50, at inside front cover
(emphasis added).
72. See text accompanying note 17 supra, and note 95 infra; OHIO CONSTITU-
TIONAL COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, 311-14 (June 30, 1977); OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION COMMISSION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS VoI. 6,
2992-95. 3010-32, 3033-46 (1973-74). Both the FINAL REPORT and the LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS demonstrate the influence of the Ohio Munici-
pal League in defeating attempts to amend the constitutional home rule provision.
For a demonstration of the influence of the League in defeating an amendment to
the public institutions provision of the Ohio Constitution, Article VII, § 1 that would
have provided "least restricted alternative" language, see OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL RE-
VISION COMMISSION, 'WHAT'S LEFT COMMITTEE' PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 9, 4931-58
(1976). The League opposed such language because it "presents a zoning problem for
our membership." Id. at 4944-47.
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1977,73 led to its passage by the Ohio Senate on May 17, 1977 by a
26-5 vote,74 and the Ohio House of Representatives on July 6, 1977
by an 87-9 vote.75 The governor of Ohio signed the bill on August 1,
1977.76 Given the perceived political strength of the League, such
lopsided results were startling. The first critical step contributing to
these results consisted of two parts: identification of the League's ba-
sic policy goal and subsequent preparation of arguments to counter
it.
3. Substance of Proponents' Policy Arguments
Anticipating intensive opposition to S.B. 71, proponents prepared
the following points in response to the League's policy of local con-
trol:
(1) that S.B. 71 would indeed limit local control (proponents
decided to concede forthrightly that they advocated a limi-
tation of local control);77
(2) that this limitation was, nevertheless, absolutely essential to
the implementation of an important and legislatively ar-
ticulated goal;7
8
(3) that the developmentally disabled population, to be bene-
fited by the limitation on local control, was needy and de-
serving of concern and assistance because it had been a
victim of long-standing prejudice;79
(4) that local zoning as a public control was permissible only as
a restriction on uses of land; that, in effect, it was being
utilized in the case of community homes to discriminate
against a certain type of person; and that, therefore, this un-
fair utilization justified the limitation on local control;80
(5) that the limitation on local zoning control was narrow, no
broader than necessary-it applied only to community
73. Legislative Status Sheet, 112th General Assembly, Feb. 3, 1978 at 16.
74. Ohio Senate Journal, May 17, 1977 at 431.
75. Ohio House Journal, July 6, 1977 at 1300.
76. Legislative Status Sheet, supra note 73.
77. The principal limitation in S.B. 71 was the establishment by the state legisla-
ture of community homes as a "permitted use." Political subdivisions no longer had
authority to treat them in any way other than the one the legislature had prescribed
by statute.
78. See text accompanying notes 85-86 infra.
79. See Lippincott, supra note 3, at 769-70.
80. See Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Tp., 37 N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d
129, 140 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting).
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homes serving developmentally disabled persons, one out
of literally hundreds of types of land uses;
(6) that, despite the limitation on local control, S.B. 71 con-
tained important safeguards for municipalities and neigh-
bors;8'
(7) that this one narrow limitation was not the first domino in a
broad campaign to erode local control;82 and
(8) that if impaction and overconcentration of community
homes was to be prevented, only a regulatory scheme with
a state-wide approach could be effective.83
In effect, proponents isolated the two principal policy issues of nor-
malization and local control and structured their legislative campaign
for S.B. 71 on that basis. This produced an effective articulation of
proponents' policy goals as well as a sensitivity to the values behind
local control, the policy goal of opponents. It also dictated the draft-
ing of a bill which limited local control only to the extent necessary
and provided significant protections for municipalities to replace the
loss of local authority over community homes.84 On this basis, Ohio
legislators were able to conclude that normalization should, under
these circumstances, prevail over local control.
The critical first step in a legislative strategy is to identify and to
understand the policy goals of both proponents and opponents. Once
this is accomplished, the other elements of a successful strategy logi-
cally follow.
81 . Examples of safeguards included in S.B. 71 to help protect municipalities and
neighbors were 1) a detailed state licensing and inspection system, 2) a means to no-
tify local officials and neighbors of the planned location of a community home and an
opportunity to comment to the Director of the Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation, 3) the authorization for municipalities to treat "group homes"
(community homes with nine to sixteen residents) as conditionally permitted uses,
and 4) a requirement that insures the dispersal and prevents the overconcentration of
"'family homes" (community homes with eight or fewer residents). See Appendix B.
82. Municipal officials frequently contended that if S.B. 71 was enacted, home
rule and local control in Ohio soon would be destroyed. In response to this claim,
proponents cited to state legislators the League's remarkable success in defeating pro-
posals to limit local power. See note 95 infra. The League's legislative record sug-
gested that even if S.B. 71 passed municipalities would in no way be defenseless. In
effect, proponents tried in this way to turn municipal strength and past success into an
argument in favor of S.B. 71.
83. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
84. See note 81 supra.
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B. Legislative Articulation of the Normalization Policy
A successful legislative advocate must effectively articulate his pol-
icy goal to legislators. This task is greatly facilitated if other influen-
tial organizations espouse similar goals. Moreover, if the state
legislature is one of the organizations that already has articulated the
policy goal, then the advocate enjoys an enormous advantage.
In Ohio, OARC had adopted and advocated normalization as a
policy goal prior to its efforts to achieve passage of S.B. 71. OARC
had strongly supported prior institutional rights legislation85 for men-
tally retarded persons which also had no normalization as its basic
policy goal. Section 5123.67(D) of the Ohio Revised Code, the pur-
pose clause of S.B. 336, read as follows: "To maximize the assimila-
tion of mentally retarded persons into the ordinary life of the
communities in which they live." The principal draftsman of S.B.
336, Professor Michael Kindred, intended this section to serve as
more than merely the purpose clause of that bill; its second function
was to be the legislative articulation of the policy of normalization
that would be useful in passing the state zoning legislation. Thus,
when proponents of S.B. 71 in 1977 presented their arguments in
favor of normalization and the limitation of local control, they
pointed out that the Ohio General Assembly had already fully em-
braced normalization as a guiding policy in developmental disability
and mental retardation programs. This point greatly strengthened
proponents' policy arguments, inasmuch as they were advocating the
enunciated policy of the Ohio legislature as well as their own policy
goal. 6
Proponents in other states are advised to seek a legislative articula-
tion of normalization prior to introduction of a state zoning bill, and
85. See note 68 supra.
86. An example of these arguments is presented in the following quote from writ-
ten testimony presented by Professor Kindred to the Ohio House of Representatives
on June 15, 1977:
This state policy was best articulated in S.B. 336, which passed the Legislature in
1974 with nearly unanimous support from both parties. Section 5123.67 sets the
policy of that legislation: this policy has been further supported by passage of
H.B. 1215 last year and by the allocation of substantial state funds to support the
development of community residential programs.
At its base, this well-articulated state legislative and administrative policy is
founded on constitutional principles. These principles are very simply that per-
sons may not be needlessly segregated from the community, that they may not be
placed in dehumanizing warehouses, and that they have a right to placement in
the least restrictive setting suitable to their needs.
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then, of course, to exploit it in their lobbying efforts. If proponents
are fortunate enough to already have such a provision enacted in
their state, they should take full advantage of the leverage it provides
in lobbying for their state zoning legislation.
C. Strategy Considerations in Constitutional Home Rule States
Forty states are constitutional home rule states.87 Constitutional
home rule is a major impediment to state zoning legislation because
it operates to restrain the authority of a state legislature to limit local
control over regulations such as zoning.8 8 Because constitutional
home rule can be an important obstacle to state legislation limiting
local zoning authority, any strategy to achieve state community home
legislation in the forty constitutional home rule jurisdictions must
carefully deal with this problem. 9
Home rule has, in reality, two different aspects. First, it is a politi-
cal concept connoting local autonomy or local control over political
matters, such as self-determination of means and goals without inter-
ference by the legislature or other agencies of state government. Sec-
ond, home rule is a constitutional doctrine that actually distributes
power between state and local governments. In this second aspect,
home rule is a grant of power through a constitutional provision in
certain substantive and procedural areas; it is, in effect, a means of
87. Forty state constitutions contain some sort of home rule provision. See
ALASKA CONST. art. X; ARIZ. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 2-3; CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3, 5-7;
COLO. CONST. art. XX; CONN. CONST. art X; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1(g), 2(b); GA.
CONST. art. XV; HAWAII CONST. art. VII, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2; ILL.
CONST. art. VII, § 6; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 39A; KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 5; LA.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 4-6; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § I; MD. CONST. arts. XI-A, XI-E,
XI-F; MASS. CONST. amend. LXXXIX, § 235; MICH. CONST. art. VII, §§ 2,22; MINN.
CONST. art. XII, § 4; Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 18(a)-(s), 19-19(a); MONT. CONST. art.
XI, §§ 5-6; NEB. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2-5; NEV. CONsT. art. VIII, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt.
1. art. XXXIX; N.M. CONST. art. X, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. IX; N.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 130; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII; OKLA. CONST. art XVIII, §§ 3-4; OR. CONST. art. XI,
§ 2; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. of amend. XXVIII; S.C. CONST. art.
VIII, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 9; TEx. CONST. art XI,
§ 5; UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. XI, §§ 10-11; W. VA. CONST. art.
VI, § 39(a); Wis. CONST. art. XI, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. See generally Van-
landingham, Constitutional Municial Home Rule Since the AMA (NLcJ Model, 17
WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1 (1975).
88. For a discussion of the barriers home rule poses to state legislation aimed at
combating exclusionary zoning of low- and moderate-income housing, see Simmons,
supra note 16.
89. See ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 9-11.
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implementing the political concept of local control. 90
In Ohio, the distinction between home rule in the constitutional
sense and home rule in the political sense dictated important strategy
considerations. Proponents decided that the two aspects of home rule
should be handled as separate issues. When S.B. 336, Ohio's institu-
tional rights bill for mentally retarded persons,9 was first introduced
into the Ohio General Assembly it included language that indicated
that favorable zoning treatment for community homes was of "state-
wide concern."92 This language was borrowed from the California
state zoning legislation passed in 1970,93 and community home pro-
ponents had hoped that it would solve the community home zoning
problem in Ohio.
These hopes were not well-founded. While the California and
Ohio constitutional home rule provisions are somewhat similar, the
judicial interpretations in the two states vary significantly. Although
"state-wide concern" language was constitutionally acceptable in a
California statute, it creates a potential constitutional problem in an
Ohio statute.94 The importance of avoiding constitutional objections
90. See Sandalow, The Limits ofMuniipal Power Under Home Rule: 4 Rolefor
the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 644-45 (1963-64).
91. See note 68 supra.
92. See note 94 infra.
93. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5115-5116 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978).
94. Article XVIII, § 3, Ohio's constitutional home rule provision reads: "Munici-
palities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to
adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar
regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." The two clauses of this provi-
sion have led to two different types of state legislation to limit local power in Ohio.
Historically, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld limitations on local power only when a
statute complied with the second clause and met the highly specialized and pro-mu-
nicipal definitions that the court adopted for "conflict" in Village of Struthers v. So-
kol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923), and for "general law" in Village of West
Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 111, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
On occasion the court deviated from its strong pro-municipal position and sug-
gested that the first clause of Article XVIII, § 3 also provides a means to limit local
power. See, e.g., Beachwood v. Board of Elections of Cuyahoga County, 167 Ohio St.
369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958). Some commentators have advocated this "statewide con-
cern" approach. See Simmons, supra note 16. Other commentators and municipal
advocates have criticized this "statewide concern" approach because it would greatly
facilitate statutory limitations on local authority. See, e.g., Vaubel, Of Concern to
Painesville-Or Only to the State: Home Rule in the Context ofUtilities Regulation, 33
OHIO ST. L. J. 257 (1972); Vaubel, Mfunici7alHome Rule in Ohio, 3 OHIO N. L. REv. 3
(1975). For the reaction of the Ohio Municipal League, see text accompanying note
95 infra.
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in Ohio lobbying efforts on behalf of the state zoning bill is demon-
strated by the following experience communicated by a key advocate
of the Ohio institutional rights legislation.
I can tell you from my recollection, however, that S.B. 336, as
submitted by Senator O'Casek had a section that closely tracked
the California language. It got removed from the bill under the
circumstances below.
You asked me how the language that was intended to override
local zoning obstacles to small homes for the mentally retarded
came to be deleted from S.B. 336.
I was in the middle of some fairly lengthy testimony before
the Senate Sub-Committee considering the bill. Senator Paul
Matia was Chairman and Senators Oliver O'Casek and Buzz
Lukens completed this sub-committee. All of a sudden the door
of Room D opened and Senator Matia asked me if he could in-
terrupt me for a moment and announced he had just noticed
John Gotherman of the Ohio Municipal League enter the room.
He asked Mr. Gotherman if he had any brief comments he
wished to make on S.B. 336. Mr. Gotherman replied that the
League had serious objections to the language in question on
policy grounds and that they also felt that the language would
transgress the Ohio constitution.
A few minutes later the language was out of the bill. I do not
recall the intervening exchange precisely. To the best of my rec-
ollection, however, Senator Matia asked me if this language was
crucial to the rest of the bill and indicated that he thought it
would cause serious troublefor the bill. I indicated the issue was
severable from the other portions of the bill and that he would
be willing to deal with the issue in separate legislation in order to
insure smooth and speedy passage of S.B. 336. Mr. Gotherman
smiled and departed.
Mr. Gotherman later told me that he had not seen the lan-
guage himself, but that Senator Matia had called it to his atten-
tion.9" [emphasis added]
What had happened? Because the state zoning provision in S.B.
336 had used the term "state-wide concern," it caused "serious
trouble," i.e., a potential constitutional issue. The League, therefore,
had a political argument of decisive weight-that proponents had
drafted an unconstitutional bill. As long as that attack could be
made, the policy issues of normalization versus local control would
never get a fair hearing.
95. Letter from Michael Kindred to Robert Hopperton (Nov. 21, 1978).
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In Ohio it was necessary to draft a state zoning bill as well as a
lobbying strategy that would avoid this type of devastating attack in
the legislature.96 The strategy adopted was first to isolate the consti-
tutional and policy aspects of home rule, then to solve the constitu-
tional problem by conforming S.B. 71 to the Ohio Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Ohio constitutional home rule provision re-
garding acceptable ways to limit local police power,97 and finally to
battle with the League solely on the policy aspects of normalization
versus local control.98
The strategy worked effectively in Ohio because it removed consti-
tutional home rule as a lobbying weapon. The veteran state house
observers who predicted early and decisive defeat for state zoning
96. ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 9-I1.
97. In drafting S.B. 71, proponents concluded that any bill that was to avoid the
devastating political attack that the League could direct at a "state-wide concern" bill
(such as one drafted to limit local power based on the first clause of Article XVIII,
§ 3) would have to be written to comply with the second clause of Article XVIII, § 3.
In other words, it would have to meet the pro-municipal, specialized tests for "con-
flict" and "general law" adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court. See note 94 supra.
S.B. 71 was so drafted. It met the "conflict" test because it permitted the community
homes that local ordinances prohibited and it met the "general laws" test because it
was a licensing statute which by Ohio Supreme Court definition constituted a "gen-
eral law." See Village of West Jefferson v. Robinson, I Ohio St. 2d 113, 205 N.E.2d
382 (1965). For a discussion of "statewide concern" and "conflict with general law"
approaches to state limitation of local power in Ohio, see Simmons, supra note 16;
Vaubel, supra note 94.
Tactically, what the proponents did at this point was to draft both a "statewide
concern" version and a "conflict with general law" version of Ohio's state zoning
legislation. Proponents then took these two versions to the chief counsel of the
League and said that they intended to get state zoning legislation introduced. Propo-
nents asked the chief counsel which version the League favored. The chief counsel
replied that the League would be strongly opposed to both versions on policy grounds
but the "conflict with general law" version would be preferable because it would not
raise the constitutional home rule problem that the "state wide concern" version
posed. The proponents had alerted the League to the coming introduction of state
zoning legislation, but they had received, in return, informal acceptance of the consti-
tutionality of the "conflict with general law" version.
Later, a critical point in the lobbying process was reached when the chief counsel of
the League in an April 5, 1977 memo to the chairman of the Education and Health
Committee of the Ohio Senate stated: "We have worked with Professor Hopperton
on the legal aspects of the bill as they relate to the home rulepowers and believe they
have been resolved by the bill or can be resolved during the legislative process." (Em-
phasis in original.) After the chief counsel's memo, no legislators raised constitutional
objections of the sort Senator Matia had raised regarding S.B. 336. See text accompa-
nying note 95 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 68-84 supra.
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legislation99 (due in large part to the ability of the League to use the
constitutional aspect of home rule as a lobbying weapon) had not
anticipated a bill that solved the constitutional issue. Thus, the politi-
cal attack based on "unconstitutionality" was avoided and princi-
pally because of this factor the final votes in favor of S.B. 71 were
overwhelmingly favorable."°
The Ohio experience demonstrates that constitutional home rule is
not an insurmountable obstacle to state zoning legislation as long as a
sound strategy is adopted. That strategy is to separate home rule into
its two aspects, then to address the constitutional dimension of home
rule through a careful and legally sound means of limiting local au-
thority, and finally, having isolated the policy issues, to persuasively
advocate normalization.''
D. Demonstrate How Local Zoning Frustrates Normalization
Most legislative efforts pit laudable policy goals against each other.
Laudable goals such as environment versus jobs, energy indepen-
dence versus control of inflation, or, as in the case of state zoning
legislation, normalization versus local control, frequently compete in
legislative battles. To be successful in a legislative effort, however,
more than a laudable goal is needed. The effective advocate must
show why his laudable policy goal should supersede that of his oppo-
nents. This need was demonstrated in Ohio, where legislators, after
hearing the initial arguments on both sides of S.B. 71 said, in effect,
fine, we understand the goal of assimilation of the developmentally
disabled into the ordinary life of the communities in the state; we
know that we have already adopted that goal in previous statutes; we
recognize that the League is not contending that the bill is unconsti-
tutional; 1 2 but is it really needed? Must the General Assembly take
the extraordinary step of limiting local control over this type of land
use decision in order to implement normalization?
In response to this question, proponents prepared the fourth ele-
ment of their legislative strategy-a demonstration to legislators that
local zoning ordinances defeated efforts to achieve normalization.
Proponents showed legislators a balanced sample of zoning ordi-
99. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
100. See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
101, See text accompanying notes 68-84 supra.
102. See note 97 supra.
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nances from around the state. The zoning ordinances spoke for
themselves; either through specific exclusions of community homes
or, more often, through narrow definitions of "family" virtually every
ordinance excluded or severely restricted these homes. Proponents
also showed legislators that in one Ohio city that formerly permitted
community homes through a broad definition of family, the city
council amended the definition of "family" to exclude the homes.'
03
These points demonstrated in an abstract way that local zoning
blocked normalization.
Ironically, the same point was presented to state legislators by local
officials who testified against S.B. 71. One mayor testified that his
city had the absolute right to exclude homes for developmentally dis-
abled persons and that the Ohio General Assembly should stay out of
local affairs. That mayor unwittingly became a real-life example of
what proponents of S.B. 71 argued was an abuse of local zoning pow-
ers. Proponents frequently cited his testimony to state legislators
when asked if local zoning was indeed a major barrier to normaliza-
tion.
Obviously, proponents of state zoning legislation must be able to
establish the necessity of such legislation. This is critical when two
worthy, conflicting policy goals, such as normalization and local con-
trol, compete. Proponents must show that a limitation of one is nec-
essary because it impedes the implementation of the other. The
demonstration of necessity can be made in an abstract way. More-
over, if an opponent helps to make the argument in a concrete way,
this testimony can be used effectively.
E. Demonstrate that State Legislation is the Only Alternative
Elements of an effective legislative strategy include identification
of policy issues, prior legislative articulation of the normalization, ef-
fective treatment of constitutional home rule, and showing that local
zoning frustrates normalization. These may not, however, be suffi-
cient. An additional critical element is the ability to demonstrate that
no feasible alternative to state zoning legislation exists. In Ohio, this
was accomplished by explaining the failure of concerted efforts to
achieve favorable zoning treatment for community homes at the local
level."m The unsuccessful attempt at local legislative reform pro-
103. ABA PROJEcT, supra note 3, at 3 n.20.
104. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
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vided advocates of S.B. 71 with critically important information that
demonstrated state zoning legislation was the only solution to local
barriers. Had this attempt not preceded the state legislative efforts,
legislators would in all likelihood have asked proponents to make a
good faith effort at local legislation. Having already made that effort,
proponents of S.B. 71 could justify to state legislators the need for
state zoning legislation for community homes.
State zoning legislation will succeed, if at all, only after state legis-
lators are satisfied that it is the single, reasonable solution. An essen-
tial element of the strategy to enact community home legislation then
is to make this argument effectively. Otherwise, reluctant legislators
and opponents of state zoning limitations can argue persuasively for
delay of state action until the alternatives are exhausted.
F. Development of Proponents' Negotiating Position
Well-drafted legislation plus a sound, well-executed strategy usu-
ally guarantee that a bill will progress through legislative channels.
This progress, however, will result in a new set of questions for the
legislative advocate. Supporters, other interested parties, and oppo-
nents will, at various points, propose amendments to the legislation.
Therefore, another cornerstone of a legislative strategy is the devel-
opment of a negotiating position on possible amendments.
In Ohio, the preparation of this element started quite early, during
the drafting stages of S.B. 71. First, proponents, recognizing that the
legislative process was one of compromise and accommodation of
conflicting interests, determined which provisions had to be included
in S.B. 71 if meaningful normalization was to be achieved. These
components were:
1) establishment of smaller community homes ("Family
Homes") as permitted uses; 0 5
2) inclusion of "Family Homes" (as permitted uses) in all resi-
dential zones-single family as well as multiple family-
throughout the state; ° and
3) a direct tie between community homes and a state licensing
system for community home operators.1°7
Proponents agreed that compromise on these three points would
render ineffective the limitation on local control and therefore defeat
105. See S.B. 71 § 5123.18(D), Appendix B infra.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 5123.18(C).
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the normalization goal. This conclusion dictated the first part of the
proponents' negotiating position on S.B. 71-no compromise on the
three core provisions.
The next step was to decide which provisions were nonessential.
Examples of provisions deemed dispensable were:
1) establishment of the size of "Family Homes" at eight resi-
dents; 10 8
2) inclusion of the larger community homes ("Group Homes")
in S.B. 71;109 and
3) treatment of "Group Homes" as a permitted use if they were
included in S.B. 71.110
These points were examples of potential bargaining chips. If com-
promise was necessary they could be conceded without impairing the
fundamental thrust of S.B. 71.
Early and thoughtful delineation of the essential and nonessential
components of S.B. 71 prepared proponents well for the give and take
of the legislative process. Most of the amendments suggested by in-
terests such as the League were anticipated and effective negotiating
positions were defined. As a result, none of the essential provisions
and only one of the nonessential provisions were affected by amend-
ments."' The League did propose, however, two "surprise" addi-
tions, one procedural," 2 the other substantive. 1 3  Because
108. Id. § 5123.18(A)(3).
109. Id. §5123.18(A)(4). Proponents would have been willing to delete the
"group home" provision from S.B. 71 because of a conviction that the smaller "family
home" provides the community-based residences most nearly like normal family ar-
rangements. Therefore, while the "family home," being the optimal living arrange-
ment, was an indispensable provision, the "group home" provision was expendable.
See ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 14.
110. S.B. 71 § 5123.18(A)(4), Appendix B infra. Proponents concluded that if the
"group home" was to be included, an acceptable trade off was to allow municipalities
to treat it as a conditionally permitted use.
I 11. "Group homes" were included in S.B. 71, but cities that had enacted a zon-
ing ordinance could exclude them from "planned unit developments" and from sin-
gle-family zones, and could treat them as a conditionally permitted use.
112. S.B. 71 § 5123.18(C), Appendix B infra. The Ohio Municipal League indi-
cated during consideration of S.B. 71 in the Ohio House that it would stop its "pub-
lic" opposition to the bill if two amendments were added. The first was the three-part
procedure in the state licensing subsection of S.B. 71 calling for 1) notice to political
subdivisions from the state prior to licensure of a community home within the politi-
cal subdivision, 2) an opportunity for officials and residents of the political subdivi-
sion to comment, and 3) the appropriate state official to make written findings to
accompany his licensure decision. See S.B. 71 § 5123.18(D), Appendix B infra.
113. The substantive amendment that the League asked for as a price for ending
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proponents already had analyzed most of the possible compromises
and their consequences, they were able to decide relatively quickly
and easily whether to accept the League amendments." 4
A legislative advocate should frame his negotiating position as a
politician does. The effective politician is aware of his party's goals
and knows how to mesh the needs of his constituents into the overall
party platform. Advocates who have not clearly defined their negoti-
ating plan as an element of their overall strategy may react to pro-
posed amendments in ways that violate their basic policy goal.
G. ldentfcation of Developmental Disability
The elements discussed thus far are necessary to a legislative strat-
egy sufficient to enact a state zoning statute for developmentally dis-
abled persons. Each is critical because it answers a hard question
its "public" opposition to the bill was a "grandfather clause" designed to permit the
II Ohio municipalities that previously had specifically allowed community homes
(through conditionally permitted uses) to continue their treatment of these homes
notwithstanding S.B. 71. Litigation concerning this clause has occurred in Ohio with
the City of Columbus contending that it meets the "specifically permitting" language
of § 5123.18(G) because it had permitted one or two community homes under its
general "variance" device. See Columbus v. Rhodes, No. 79-AP-214 (October 9,
1979). This contention by the City of Columbus is contrary to the intent behind
§ 5123.18(G) which was designed to allow only cities that had provisions expressly
providing for community homes to continue their prior zoning treatment of commu-
nity homes.
114. The two amendments proposed by the League provided two different negoti-
ating questions. The procedural amendment caused no disagreement among propo-
nents because it merely added some steps to the state licensing process. It would
mean only some additional work for the Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation.
The second League amendment posed a more difficult choice for proponents. Pro-
ponents had been unable to predict how the floor vote on S.B. 71 would go in the
Ohio House of Representatives so the possibility of removing the League's public
opposition was viewed as most attractive, perhaps critical to ultimate passage. On the
other hand, proponents anticipated that § 5123.18(G) might encourage a city that had
never provided spee'ic, favorable treatment to do just what Columbus did in claiming
that, because it had allowed a community home under a general variance or special
exception device, it had met the requirements of § 5123.18(G). Proponents resolved
to accept the "grandfather clause" amendment because the "specifically permitting"
language clearly indicated that the intent of the provision was to include only the II
cities that had explicitly allowed licensed residential facilities in their zoning ordi-
nances. The addition of "specifically permitting" language (plus the fact that
§ 5123.18(G) was severable from the rest of S.B. 71) justified to a majority of propo-
nents the acceptance of the "grandfather" provision in exchange for League non-op-
position to S.B. 71.
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asked by opponents or a critical concern expressed by legislators.
Failure to include any one in a legislative strategy could be decisive.
The importance of the last element-identification of developmental
disability and mental retardation' P is more subjective, and thus
more difficult to discuss with precision.
This element answers questions seldom asked explicitly, but fre-
quently implied, by both opponents and legislators. For instance, in-
quiries about dangers of increased crime in residential
neighborhoods having community homes often disguise questions
such as: "What is developmental disability?" or "What is mental re-
tardation?" Most legislators probably wonder what developmental
disability or mental retardation is, what implications it has for those
who suffer from it, and those who live around it. Legislators, how-
ever, may be afraid to ask and, thereby, find out all they ever wanted
to know about developmental disability.
As with element (D) above, it is possible to demonstrate what de-
velopmental disability is in an abstract way. For example, defini-
tions, statistics on its incidence, and professional opinions on its
meaning and treatment can be recited in testimony before legislative
committees. Nevertheless, the definitions, statistics, and professional
pronouncements do not necessarily provide legislators with a gut-
level understanding. To give legislators a first-hand, concrete experi-
ence with developmental disability, Ohio proponents of S.B. 71 in-
vited a developmentally disabled (mentally retarded) woman to
testify at the first legislative committee hearing on the bill. She gave
the following testimony:
I lived in a state institution from an early age until I was 39. It
was smelly, dirty, noisy, and there were too many people there. I
didn't like living there.
Now, I live in a community home on a nice street. I like living
there. I have made friends with the other people who live and
work there. I now have a job.
Most of my friends still live in the state institution. One of
them was recently assaulted and robbed there. I hope you can
do something so my friends can live in a community home some
day. Thank you.
After a long pause the committee chairperson asked other members
of the committee if there were any questions. There were none. He
115. See note 19 supra;, MODEL STATUTE § 2, Appendix A infra.
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thanked the witness in a fatherly way and told her she could step
down. As the woman walked back to her seat, every eye was on her.
No one could accurately estimate the impact that woman's testi-
mony had on legislators. It may have had little; or, it may have re-
moved much of the mystery, fear, and embarrassment of
developmental disability harbored by at least some members of the
committee. After her testimony, developmental disability was proba-
bly no longer a strange abstraction; it may well have been personal-
ized and made concrete for everyone in that hearing room.
Other proponents testified that evening but their testimony seemed
anti-climactic. The following week at the opponents' hearing a city
official from a suburb of a large Ohio city testified that community
homes for the developmentally disabled would result in an increase
of violent crime in good residential neighborhoods around the state.
Questions of that witness from committee members indicated that his
testimony about the "evils" of developmental disability had been
given little credence.
As indicated, one's views of the overall effect of testimony by a
developmentally disabled witness are unverifiable. In Ohio, the leg-
islative strategy included this type of testimony, not only because it
helped to identify developmental disability for legislators, but also
because a developmentally disabled person, directly affected by the
legislation at issue, testified competently and effectively about a bill
directly related to the normalization goal. That is what normaliza-
tion is about-preparing developmentally disabled persons to partici-
pate in the normal activities of the community.
VI. CONCLUSION
Proponents of normalization for developmentally disabled persons
are often passionate advocates of zoning reform for the community
homes. Unfortunately, this type of advocacy frequently leads to a
"we're the good guys, they're the bad guys" approach to legislative
strategy that is usually counter-productive in legislative corridors.
At issue in state zoning legislation for community homes is a deci-
sion as to which deserves higher state priority-normalization, more
specifically community-based residential services for developmen-
tally disabled persons, or local control over zoning. Obviously, both
normalization and local control are commendable policy goals that
serve useful purposes, and the arena to best solve this conflict is the
state legislature. Elected representatives, however, not only serve all
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social, economic, ethnic, religious, and geographical groups within a
state, but also may have started their public careers as local officials.
As a result, legislative strategies based on a "good guys/bad guys"
approach, deriving more from emotion than well-thought-out plans
and sound preparation, are likely to fail. Effective lobbying on be-
half of state zoning legislation for community homes requires a
sound strategy based on a detached, dispassionate, and balanced as-
sessment of the probable constitutional, legal, and political barriers.
Proponents must recognize that state zoning legislation is a contro-
versial, complex, and difficult issue that will produce intensive and
effective opposition from experienced interest groups. That recogni-
tion should lead to a long-term and comprehensive strategy that iso-
lates policy issues, deals with constitutional questions, persuades
legislators of the necessity and reasonableness of state zoning legisla-
tion, insures effective negotiation, and provides knowledge of the
population benefited. Such a strategy can anticipate and answer the
difficult questions and problems posed by opponents and legislators.
Obviously, legislative strategies will vary from state to state, but
this discussion of the experience of one state should provide a valua-
ble case study. As Judge Schneider pointed out, 1 6 however, the most
important element in legislative success, is local effort and commit-
ment; and this, of course, depends on a great deal more than the
availability of model statutes and suggested strategies.
116. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
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APPENDIX A
American Bar Association
ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled
MODEL STATUTE
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE RIGHT TO LOCATE COM-
MUNITY HOMES FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED
PERSONS IN THE RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS OF
THIS STATE.
Section 1. Title
This act shall be known as the "Location Act for Community
Homes for Developmentally Disabled Persons."
Section 2. Statement of Purpose
The general assembly declares that it is the goal of this act to im-
prove the quality of life of all developmentally disabled persons and
to integrate developmentally disabled persons into the mainstream of
society by ensuring them the availability of community residential
opportunities in the residential areas of this state. In order to imple-
ment this goal, this act should be liberally construed toward that end.
Section 3. Definitions
As used in this act:
(1) "Developmental Disability" means a disability of a person
which:
(a)(i) is attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy,
or autism;
(ii) is attributable to any other condition found to be closely re-
lated to mental retardation because such condition results in similar
impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior
to that of mentally retarded persons or requires treatment and serv-
ices similar to those required for such persons; or
(iii) is attributable to dyslexia resulting from a disability de-
scribed in clause (i) or (ii) of this paragraph; and
(b) has continued or can be expected to continue indefinitely.
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(2) "Developmentally Disabled Person" means a person with a de-
velopmental disability.
(3) "Director" means the director of developmental disabilities (or
appropriate state official).
(4) "Family Home" means a community-based residential home
licensed by the director that provides room and board, personal care,
habilitation services, and supervision in a family environment for not
more than [six (6)] developmentally disabled persons.
(5) "Permitted Use" means a use by right which is authorized in
all residential zoning districts.
(6) "Political Subdivision" means a municipal corporation, town-
ship, or county.
Section 4. Permitted Use for Family Homes
A family home is a residential use of property for the purposes of
zoning and shall be treated as a permitted use in all residential zones
or districts, including all single-family residential zones or districts, of
all political subdivisions. No political subdivision may require that a
family home, its owner, or operator obtain a conditional use permit,
special use permit, special exception, or variance.
Section 5. Licensing Regulations and Density Control for Family
Homes
(1) For the purposes of safeguarding the health and safety of de-
velopmentally disabled persons and avoiding over-concentration of
family homes, either along or in conjunction with similar commu-
nity-based residences, the director or the director's designee shall in-
spect and license the operation of family homes and may renew and
revoke such licenses. A license is valid for one year from the date it is
issued or renewed although the director may inspect such homes
more frequently, if needed. The director shall not issue or renew and
may revoke the license of a family home not operating in compliance
with this section and regulations adopted hereunder. Within one
hundred eighty (180) days of the enactment of this act, the director
shall promulgate regulations which shall encompass the following
matters:
(a) Limits on the number of new family homes to be permitted
on blocks, block faces, and other appropriate geographic areas taking
into account the existing residential population density and the
number, occupancy, and location of similar community residential
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facilities serving persons in drug, alcohol, juvenile, child, parole, and
other programs of treatment, care, supervision, or rehabilitation in a
community setting;
(b) Assurance that adequate arrangements are made for the resi-
dents of family homes to receive such care and habilitation as is nec-
essary and appropriate to their needs and to further their progress
towards independent living;
(c) Protection of the health and safety of the residents of family
homes, provided that compliance with these regulations shall not re-
lieve the owner or operator of any family home of the obligation to
comply with the requirements or standards of a political subdivision
pertaining to building, housing, health, fire, safety, and motor vehicle
parking space that generally apply to single family residences in the
zoning district; and provided further that no requirements for busi-
ness licenses, gross receipt taxes, environmental impact studies or
clearances may be imposed on such homes if such fees, taxes, or
clearances are not imposed on all structures in the zoning district
housing a like number of persons;
(d) Procedures by which any resident of a residential zoning dis-
trict or the governing body of a political subdivision in which a fam-
ily home is, or is to be, located may petition the director to deny an
application for a license to operate a family home on the grounds that
the operation of such a home would be in violation of the limits es-
tablished under paragraph (1)(a) of this section.
(2) All applicants for a license to operate a family home shall
apply to the director for the license and shall file a copy of the appli-
cation with the governing body of the political subdivision having
jurisdiction over the zoning of the land on which the family home is
to be located. All applications must include population and occu-
pancy statistics reflecting compliance with the limits established pur-
suant to paragraph (1)(a) of this section.
(3) The Director may not issue a license for a family home until
the applicant has submitted proof of filing with the governing body of
the political subdivision having jurisdiction over the zoning of the
land on which such a home is to be located, a copy of the application
at least thirty (30) days prior to the granting of such a license, and
any amendment of the application increasing the number of residents
to be served at least fifteen (15) days prior to the granting of a license.
(4) In order to facilitate the implementation of paragraph (1)(a),
the director shall maintain a list of the location, capacity, and current
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occupancy of all family homes. The director shall ensure that this list
shall not contain the names or other identifiable information about
any residents of such home and that copies of this list shall be avail-
able to any resident of this state and any state agency or political
subdivision upon request.
Section 6. Exclusion by Private Agreement Void
Any restriction, reservation, condition, exception, or covenant in
any subdivision plan, deed, or other instrument of or pertaining to
the transfer, sale, lease, or use of property which would permit resi-
dential use of property but prohibit the use of such property as a
family home for developmentally disabled persons shall, to the extent
of such prohibition, be void as against the public policy of this state
and shall be given no legal or equitable force or effect.
Section 7. Severability of Sections
If any section, subsection, paragraph, sentence, or any other part of
this act is adjudged unconstitutional or invalid, such judgment shall
not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of this act, but shall be
confined to the section, subsection, paragraph, sentence, or any other
part of this act directly involved in the controversy in which said
judgment has been rendered.
APPENDIX B
Sub. S.B. No. 71
A Bill
To amend sections 3313.74, 5123.19, and 5123.99, to enact new
section 5123.18, and to repeal section 5123.18 of the Revised
Code to expand the licensing program for residential facili-
ties to include developmentally disabled persons and per-
sons requiring similar services, and to limit restrictions on
the location of such facilities.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio:
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SECTION 1. That sections 3313.74, 5123.19, and 5123.99 be
amended and section 5123.18 of the Revised Code be enacted to read
as follows:
Sec. 3313.74. No person, firm, partnership, or corporation shall es-
tablish any institution to house or care for thef-i-ewing persons
SUFFERING FROM A COMMUNICABLE DISEASE, AS DE-
FINED BY THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH, within two thousand
feet of any public, private, or parochial school operating under the
standards set by the school laws or school land used for recreational
purposes in connection with school activities.
(A) Persons sutffring from a eemmunieable disease as defined by
the direetor of health,-
(D) Persons adjudged to be mentally ill, fccble minided, epileptie,
This section does not apply to members of an established house-
hold suffering from such ailments.
Sec. 5123.18. (A) AS USED IN THIS SECTION AND SEC-
TION 5123.19 OF THE REVISED CODE:
(1) "RESIDENTIAL FACILITY" MEANS A HOME OR FA-
CILITY IN WHICH A PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITY RESIDES, EXCEPT A HOME SUBJECT TO
CHAPTER 3721. OF THE REVISED CODE OR THE HOME OF
A RELATIVE OR LEGAL GUARDIAN IN WHICH A PERSON
WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY RESIDES.
(2) "DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY" MEANS A DISABIL-
ITY THAT ORIGINATED BEFORE THE ATTAINMENT OF
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO
CONTINUE INDEFINITELY, CONSTITUTES A SUBSTAN-
TIAL HANDICAP TO THE PERSON'S ABILITY TO FUNC-
TION NORMALLY IN SOCIETY, AND IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO
MENTAL RETARDATION, CEREBRAL PALSY, EPILEPSY,
AUTISM, OR ANY OTHER CONDITION FOUND TO BE
CLOSELY RELATED TO MENTAL RETARDATION BE-
CAUSE SUCH CONDITION RESULTS IN SIMILAR IMPAIR-
MENT OF GENERAL INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING OR
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR OR REQUIRES SIMILAR TREAT-
MENT AND SERVICES.
(3) "FAMILY HOME" MEANS A RESIDENTIAL FACILITY
THAT PROVIDES ROOM AND BOARD, PERSONAL CARE,
HABILITATION SERVICES, AND SUPERVISION IN A FAM-
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ILY SETTING FOR NOT MORE THAN EIGHT PERSONS
WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES.
(4) "GROUP HOME" MEANS A RESIDENTIAL FACILITY
THAT PROVIDES ROOM AND BOARD, PERSONAL CARE,
HABILITATION SERVICES, AND SUPERVISION IN A FAM-
ILY SETTING FOR AT LEAST NINE BUT NOT MORE THAN
SIXTEEN PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILI-
TIES.
(5) "POLITICAL SUBDIVISION" MEANS A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, COUNTY, OR TOWNSHIP.
() EVERY PERSON DESIRING TO OPERATE A RESI-
DENTIAL FACILITY SHALL APPLY FOR LICENSURE OF
THE FACILITY TO THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF
MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISA-
BILITIES.
(g THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF MENTAL RETAR-
DATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES SHALL LI-
CENSE AND INSPECT THE OPERATION OF RESIDENTIAL
FACILITIES AND MAY RENEW AND REVOKE SUCH
LICENSES. A LICENSE IS VALID FOR ONE YEAR FROM
THE DATE IT IS ISSUED OR RENEWED. BEFORE ISSUING
OR RENEWING A LICENSE, THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION
OR HIS DESIGNEE SHALL INSPECT EACH RESIDENTIAL
FACILITY FOR WHICH APPLICATION IS MADE. THE
CHIEF OR HIS DESIGNEE MAY MAKE ADDITIONAL IN-
SPECTIONS OF A LICENSED RESIDENTIAL FACILITY. THE
CHIEF SHALL NOT ISSUE OR RENEW AND MAY REVOKE
THE LICENSE OF A RESIDENTIAL FACILITY NOT OPER-
ATED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THIS SECTION AND RULES
ADOPTED THEREUNDER. THE CHIEF SHALL ISSUE OR
RENEW THE LICENSE OF A FACILITY FOR WHICH
PROPER APPLICATION IS MADE IF THE FACILITY IS OP-
ERATED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THIS SECTION AND
RULES ADOPTED THEREUNDER. NO LICENSE FOR A
RESIDENTIAL FACILITY SHALL BE ISSUED OR RENEWED
NOR THE LOCATION OF A LICENSE BE TRANSFERRED BY
THE CHIEF UNTIL HE NOTIFIES, BY CERTIFIED MAIL, RE-
TURN RECEIPT REQUESTED, OR BY PERSONAL SERVICE,
THE CLERK OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION IF THE LOCATION OF THE
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RESIDENTIAL FACILITY IS WITHIN A MUNICIPAL CORPO-
RATION, OR THE CLERK OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS AND CLERK OF THE BOARD OF TOWN-
SHIP TRUSTEES IF THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDENTIAL
FACILITY IS LOCATED IN UNINCORPORATED TERRI-
TORY; AND AN OPPORTUNITY IS PROVIDED TO THE GEN-
ERAL PUBLIC AND OFFICIALS OR EMPLOYEES OF THE
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OR COUNTY AND TOWNSHIP,
WHICH OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SHALL BE DESIG-
NATED BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OR LEGISLA-
TIVE AUTHORITY OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OR
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OR TOWNSHIP
TRUSTEES, TO OBJECT OR TO COMMENT UPON THE AD-
VISABILITY OF THE ISSUANCE, RENEWAL OR TRANSFER
OF LOCATION OF THE LICENSE IN WRITING. THE WRIT-
TEN OBJECTIONS OR COMMENTS SHALL BE MADE TO
THE CHIEF NOT LATER THAN FORTY-FIVE DAYS AFTER
THE CHIEF NOTIFIES THE APPROPRIATE LOCAL GOV-
ERNMENTAL OFFICIALS OR BODIES. AT THE TIME OF
THE ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL OF THE LICENSE THE
CHIEF SHALL MAKE WRITTEN FINDINGS CONCERNING
THE OBJECTIONS OR COMMENTS AND HIS DECISION OF
THE ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL OF THE LICENSE.
THE CHIEF SHALL ADOPT AND MAY AMEND AND RE-
SCIND RULES ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES AND FEES
FOR ISSUING AND RENEWING LICENSES AND REGULAT-
ING THE OPERATION OF RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES.
ADOPTION, AMENDMENT, AND RESCISSION OF RULES
AND APPEALS FROM ORDERS AFFECTING ISSUANCE, RE-
NEWAL, AND REVOCATION OF LICENSES UNDER THIS
SECTION, ARE GOVERNED BY CHAPTER 119 OF THE RE-
VISED CODE.
(D) ANY PERSON MAY OPERATE A LICENSED FAMILY
HOME AS A PERMITTED USE IN ANY RESIDENTIAL DIS-
TRICT OR ZONE, INCLUDING ANY SINGLE-FAMILY RESI-
DENTIAL DISTRICT OR ZONE, OF ANY POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION. FAMILY HOMES MAY BE REQUIRED TO
COMPLY WITH AREA, HEIGHT, YARD, AND ARCHITEC-
TURAL COMPATIBILITY REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE UNI-
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FORMLY IMPOSED UPON ALL SINGLE-FAMILY
RESIDENCES WITHIN THE DISTRICT OR ZONE.
E) ANY PERSON MAY OPERATE A LICENSED GROUP
HOME AS A PERMITTED USE IN ANY MULTIPLE-FAMILY
RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT OR ZONE OF ANY POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION, EXCEPT THAT A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION
THAT HAS ENACTED A ZONING ORDINANCE OR RESO-
LUTION ESTABLISHING PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
DISTRICTS MAY EXCLUDE GROUP HOMES FROM SUCH
DISTRICTS, AND A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION THAT HAS
ENACTED A ZONING ORDINANCE OR RESOLUTION MAY
REGULATE GROUP HOMES IN MULTIPLE-FAMILY RESI-
DENTIAL DISTRICTS OR ZONES AS A CONDITIONALLY
PERMITTED USE OR SPECIAL EXCEPTION, IN EITHER
CASE, UNDER REASONABLE AND SPECIFIC STANDARDS
AND CONDITIONS SET OUT IN THE ZONING ORDINANCE
OR RESOLUTION TO:
(1) REQUIRE THE ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN AND SITE
LAYOUT OF THE HOME AND THE LOCATION, NATURE,
AND HEIGHT OF ANY WALLS, SCREENS, AND FENCES TO
BE COMPATIBLE WITH ADJOINING LAND USES AND THE
RESIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD;
(2) REQUIRE COMPLIANCE WITH YARD, PARKING,
AND SIGN REGULATION;
(3) LIMIT EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION OF HOMES.
(E) THIS SECTION DOES NOT PROHIBIT A POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION FROM APPLYING TO RESIDENTIAL FACILI-
TIES NONDISCRIMINATORY REGULATIONS REQUIRING
COMPLIANCE WITH HEALTH, FIRE, AND SAFETY REGU-
LATIONS AND BUILDING STANDARDS AND REGULA-
TIONS.
(_) DIVISIONS (p) AND (D OF THIS SECTION SHALL
NOT BE APPLICABLE TO MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
THAT HAD IN EFFECT ON JUNE 15, 1977 AN ORDINANCE
SPECIFICALLY PERMITTING IN RESIDENTIAL ZONES LI-
CENSED RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES BY MEANS OF PER-
MITTED USES, CONDITIONAL USES, OR SPECIAL
EXCEPTIONS, SO LONG AS SUCH ORDINANCE REMAINS
IN EFFECT WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIVE MODIFICA-
TION.
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Sec. 5123.19. No person shall OPERATE A RESIDENTIAL FA-
CILITY OR receive a mentally retai... person for eare in WITH A
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY AS A RESIDENT OF a resi-
dential eare facility unless such facility is licensed under section
5123.18 of the Revised Code.
Sec. 5123.99. Whoever violates section 5123.17 or 5123.19 of the
Revised Code shall be fined not mere than oe th-isand dollars or
'-aprisoned not aorc than six months, or both IS GUILTY OF A
MISDEMEANOR OF THE FIRST DEGREE.
SECTION 2. That existing sections 3313.74, 5123.19, and 5123.99
and section 5123.18 of the Revised Code are hereby repealed.
SECTION 3. Rules adopted under former section 5123.18 of the
Revised Code in effect on the effective date of this act shall remain in
effect until amended or rescinded under new section 5123.18 of the
Revised Code as enacted by this act.
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